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CFSP and ESDP: Promoting Human Security  
A Proposal for a Declaration or Protocol  
 
The European Union has crossed a rubicon in its development as a global security actor. Its 
willingness to intervene far beyond its natural backyard in difficult and dangerous locations, 
such as the Middle East, Africa and Afghanistan, to support regional and international 
organisations such as the United Nations, the African Union and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, while pursuing its distinctive approach to crisis, and its preparedness to use 
coercive force where necessary, marks a change in the evolution of its external policies. 
 
Since 2003, the EU has developed a wide range of both civilian and military security 
capabilities and has carried out 16 missions to crisis zones. It has met a growing demand for 
external intervention to bring stability and the rule of law to end violent conflict. The 
European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 provides the  framework for this role 
and for a European security identity. It sets out the challenges the European Union faces and 
how Europeans can meet them, but not much more - it does not yet amount to an operating 
manual or even a set of design instructions. 
 
There is now an opportunity and a need for Europeans to do more to fulfil their commitment 
to collective foreign and security policies for the past 15 years. In  order to progress as a 
global actor, the European Union needs to give clear political direction to its ambitions and 
responsibilities on the world stage.  
  
The ‘War on Terror’ and the period since 9/11 have focused public attention on the global 
nature of security, and the fact that instability in distant places can have a devastating effect 
on the streets of European capitals, whether it takes the form of suicide bombers on trains or 
the rioting and unrest of immigrant communities in city suburbs. Yet there is a growing 
realisation that waging ‘war’ on radicalised youth, disaffected citizens or hidden networks of 
terrorists is not working. 
 
Europeans can neither sit back and ignore these problems, nor leave them to others to resolve. 
They have the opportunity and responsibility to provide the resources and creativity to finding 
alternative solutions. With 490 million citizens, a powerful economic and trading presence 
and its own experience of forging unity and peace out of a violent history, the European 
Union has much to contribute, not just in providing the capabilities to making a safer world, 
but in terms of ideas and approach. 
 
In 2003, the Barcelona Report on European Security Capabilities proposed that Human 
Security was the most appropriate security strategy for the EU. Human Security is about the 
basic needs of individuals and communities in times of peril. It is about feeling safe on the 
street as well as about material survival and the exercise of free will. It recognises that 
‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ are both essential to people’s sense of 
wellbeing and their willingness to live in peace. 
 
Human Security has the potential to operate as a dynamic organising frame, which could give 
new direction and coherence to European efforts to address the challenges set out in the 
European Security Strategy. It augments and does not displace national security, which 
remains the preserve of Member States.  It draws on what the EU already does in terms of 
crisis management, civil-military cooperation, conflict prevention and reconstruction but takes 
 4 
them further.  It could offer greater clarity and purpose to the efforts of 27 Member States to 
use their collective voice effectively on the world stage and knit together the diverse fabric of 
the EU’s external policies. It could help to mobilise European public opinion, and enhance the 
legitimacy of the EU as a global actor. It could also strengthen the links and relationships 
between the EU and its alliance partners in different regions of the world, establishing 
common principles and operating methods on which to base effective multilateralism.  
 
The draft Reform Treaty spells out the general values and norms that guide the Union’s 
external action (article 10a), it commits Member  States to make available more military and 
civil assets to carry out the Foreign and Security Policy (article 17) and it proposes significant 
institutional changes which will increase the powers of the High Representative and establish 
an External Action Service. To make these reforms meaningful, what is needed in addition is 
a set of operational principles which will specify how these military and civil assets are to be 
used. We propose this could be done through a document (Protocol or Declaration) following 
the Treaty. 
 
The six principles of a Human Security approach are as follows: 
 
1. The Primacy of Human Rights 
The first principle is to ensure respect for human rights: to secure the safety, dignity and 
welfare of individuals and the communities in which they live. Respect for human rights is the 
main challenge – not military victory or the temporary suppression of violence. This implies 
that civilian and military initiatives should prioritise  the protection of civilians over the defeat 
of an enemy. Protection refers to both physical and material protection, that is economic and 
social as well as civil and political rights. 
 
2. Legitimate Political Authority 
A legitimate authority is trusted by the population and is responsible for law and order and 
respect of human rights. This principle means that any outside intervention must strive to 
create a legitimate political authority provided by a state, an international body or a local 
authority (a town or region). It must provide the conditions for a political process through 
which such an authority can be built and it must assist in the promotion of law and justice as 
well as the authority’s ability to guarantee material wellbeing. The intervention ust be viewed 
as legitimate locally and within the international community as a whole. 
 
3. A Bottom-up Approach 
Intensive consultation with local people is required, not only to ’win hearts and minds’ and in 
order to gain better understanding, although they are important, but to enable vulnerable 
communities to create the conditions for peace and stability themselves. This means involving 
civil society, women and young people, and not only  political leaders or those who wield 
guns. Outsiders cannot deliver human security, they can only help.  
 
4. Effective Multilateralism 
This is related to legitimacy and means a commitment to work in the framework of 
international law, alongside other international and regional agencies, individual states and 
non-state actors.  Effective multilateralism is what distinguishes a Human Security approach 
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from neo-imperialism.  It also means a better division of tasks and greater coherence, solving 
problems through rules and cooperation, and creating common policies and norms.  
 
5. An Integrated Regional Approach 
There is a tendency to focus on particular countries when dealing with crisis. Yet insecurity 
spills over borders through refugees, transnational criminal networks and so on. Regional 
dialogues and action in neighbouring countries should be systematically integrated into 
policies for crisis. 
 
6. Clear and Transparent Strategic Direction 
When the European Union intervenes externally, it must do so with clear legal authorisation, 
transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. Where European security units are 
deployed there should be close linkage between policy makers and those on the ground, with 
the former having ultimate control over operations. All EU external engagements should be 
led by civilians. 
  
Conclusion 
The success of Europe – as an integration project, rebuilding peace among its members, and 
as an economic and trading bloc - has been based on a commitment to principles, such as 
consensus ,co-operation, democracy and the rule of law. In order to realise its potential to 
contribute to a global peace, the European Union needs now to articulate such a clear set of 
principles to guide its initiatives, govern its operations and evaluate its effectiveness.  
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I Executive Summary 
 
In the past five years the European Union has developed the capacity and willingness to intervene in difficult and 
dangerous locations, to deal with crises, to improve the chances of people to lead peaceful lives and to contribute to 
regional and international security.  This Report is about how the EU has built this global security role so far, and 
where it should go next.  
 
The Barcelona Report of 2004 declared that the most appropriate approach for Europe in the twenty-first century would 
be to promote human security. This Report spells out what a European Human Security approach means, and 
addresses  the criticisms levelled at it. It looks at five cases where the EU has intervened to deal with political violence 
and to rebuild societies torn apart by civil war, and shows how a Human Security approach is relevant to those 
operations.  
 
The Report concludes that in the wake of the Reform Treaty and the ‘Global War on Terror’ the EU  should now 
define a distinctive European Way of Security, based on Human Security principles,  which would enable it to intervene 
more effectively in crises, and take forward its foreign and security policies in a way which commands the support of its 
citizens and addresses the needs of vulnerable communities. Human Security should provide a new operating framework 
for  European Union  external action.   
 
The Report proposes:  
 
 That the Member States agree a public declaration of their commitment to principles which put Human Security 
at the heart of the European Union’s external operations. This could be done in  a document (Protocol or 
Declaration) following the Reform Treaty. Such a declaration would affirm their shared beliefs and values in 
contributing to peaceful coexistence among all peoples and regions of the world. It would provide clear guidance 
from the Member States to the institutions of the European Union when the EU  acts on their behalf in crises. It 
would help to garner public support for the EU’s global role. A public statement of principles is the starting point 
for codifying a ‘European Way of Security’ and for connecting the strategic will of Member States with actions on 
the ground.  
 
 Ultimate and lasting solutions to crises require political processes, which foster Human Security. Every ESDP 
mission, including full military missions, should be placed within a new framework consisting of a comprehensive 
planning process under civilian leadership, which should be responsible for developing and implementing a 
sustained political strategy covering the deployment of EU resources.  
 
 The European Union should take steps to operationalise a Human Security doctrine, which translates Human 
Security principles into concrete and practical actions on the ground. These steps include formulating Human 
Security mandates for external operations, issuing EU personnel with ‘Human Security’ cards setting out best 
practice guidelines, training in Human Security principles and an evaluation system for missions that  uses the 
principles as benchmarks.   
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II Introduction  
 
In this Report we outline a vision for a European Way of Security , based on a set of principles that 
should be clearly defined and articulated at every level of the EU, from Member States agreeing 
collective action to the soldier, judge, policeman or tax inspector on the ground. The Barcelona 
Report proposed that a Human Security Doctrine for Europe should consist of seven principles to 
govern interventions, a 15,000-strong Human Security Response Force and a new legal framework 
for European?  Below we reiterate and refine what Human Security means in the context of the EU’s 
external policies, and how the principles can be useful not just as a description or label, but as a set of 
operational instructions. We then describe recent developments in European Security and Defence 
Policy and our findings from five cases studies of EU interventions and how far they conform to 
what we define as a  Human Security approach.  In the final section, we put forward new proposals 
for taking forward the Human Security agenda, based on what we have learned. 
 
III Human Security  
 
The Concept of Human Security 
A European Way of Security needs to show how it is distinctive. The defining characteristics of a 
European approach include the commitment to effective multilateralism and human rights as well as 
the way the European Union combines military and civil assets and has pioneered civilian crisis 
management. A European Way of Security should focus on the protection of individuals and 
communities as well as the interrelationship between ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. It 
is a hard security policy even though it stresses the civilian aspects of security. 
 
The term we use is ‘Human Security’, as the one that best fits what Europe already does, what its 
ambitions are and the unique mix of its abilities to deliver this vision.  ‘Human Security’ is a broad 
concept that encompasses many different definitions, ranging from the narrow Canadian usage  inked 
to the ‘responsibility to protect’, to the broad UNDP version that tends to equate human security 
with human development. As a description of the European Way of Security, however, it is possible 
to specify what it means with much greater precision. As an operational concept, it is possible to link 
it to how the EU behaves on the ground in external missions. 
 
Human Security is about the European Union helping to meet human need at moments of crisis, 
when people suffer not only because of wars but from natural and human-made disasters – famines, 
Tsunamis, hurricanes. Security is often viewed as the absence of physical violence and regarded as 
part of the political-military realm, while development tends to be considered part of the economic 
and social realm, and human rights are largely considered part of the civil/legal realm. Yet these 
distinctions are misleading. Development is more than material wellbeing, just as human rights must 
include economic and civil rights. Likewise, ensuring Human Security under circumstances of 
extreme vulnerability means a concern for both physical and material wellbeing. It is about helping 
people to feel safe in their homes and on the streets as well as ensuring they have what they need to 
live on. Human Security is at the sharp end of both human development and human rights. 
 
For the European Union, Human Security is more than just another security concept or label.  It can 
be seen as a narrative that encapsulates the goals and methods of a highly diverse foreign and security 
policy system, and which represents them in discussions of security to different audiences, both the 
public and professional sectors. In other words, it is about how Europeans describe their approach to 
external security. As such it is also the basis for a common security culture and identity. At the same 
time, Human Security is an organising frame that specifies how external intervention and engagement 
should be implemented.  At the heart of a European Human Security approach is the set of  
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principles, developed by the Barcelona Report, which both give substance to the concept of Human 
Security as applied by the European Union and serve as an operational methodology to guide and 
evaluate  EU international operations. In other words, it is about the goals of EU actions as well as 
the methods.  
 
The six principles of a Human Security approach are listed below. There is no hierarchy of principles. 
They are all important, interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The primacy of human rights comes 
first because it is the core of Human Security and legitimate political authority comes second because 
it is needed to deliver Human Security. Clear and transparent strategic direction comes last because it 
encompasses all the other principles. Two of the original seven principles – the use of legal 
instruments and the appropriate use of force – permeated the other five, and are integral to the 
Human Security approach, so we have left them out as separate principles. On the other hand, we 
have added the principle of ‘clear and transparent strategic direction’. On the basis of our 
examination of EU missions, this was a significant omission that would improve the effects of 
intervention on ordinary people.  
 
1. The Primacy of Human Rights 
The first principle is to ensure respect for human rights: to secure the safety, dignity and welfare of 
individuals and the communities in which they live. Respect for human rights is the main challenge – 
not military victory or the temporary suppression of violence. This implies that civilian and military 
initiatives should prioritise  the protection of civilians over the defeat of an enemy. Protection refers 
to both physical and material protection, that is economic and social as well as civil and political 
rights. 
 
2. Legitimate Political Authority 
A legitimate authority is trusted by the population and is responsible for law and order and respect of 
human rights. This principle means that any outside intervention must strive to create a legitimate 
political authority provided by a state, an international body or a local authority (a town or region). It 
must provide the conditions for a political process through which such an authority can be built and 
it must assist in the promotion of law and justice as well as the authority’s ability to guarantee material 
wellbeing. The intervention must be viewed as legitimate locally and within the international 
community as a whole. 
  
3. A Bottom-up Approach 
Intensive consultation with local people is required, not only to ’win hearts and minds’ and in order 
to gain better understanding, although they are important, but to enable vulnerable communities to 
create the conditions for peace and stability themselves. This means involving civil society, women 
and young people, and not only  political leaders or those who wield guns. Outsiders cannot deliver 
human security, they can only help.  
 
4. Effective Multilateralism 
This is related to legitimacy and means a commitment to work in the framework of international law, 
alongside other international and regional agencies, individual states and non-state actors.  Effective 
multilateralism is what distinguishes a Human Security approach from neo-imperialism.  It also means 
a better division of tasks and greater coherence, solving problems through rules and cooperation, and 
creating common policies and norms.  
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5. An Integrated  Regional Approach 
There is a tendency to focus on particular countries when dealing with crisis. Yet insecurity spills over 
borders through refugees, transnational criminal networks and so on. Regional dialogues and action in 
neighbouring countries should be systematically integrated into policies for crisis. 
 
6. Clear and Transparent Strategic Direction 
When the European Union intervenes externally, it must do so with clear legal authorisation, 
transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. Where European security units are deployed 
there should be close linkage between policy makers and those on the ground, with the former having 
ultimate control over operations.  All  EU external engagements should be led by civilians. 
 
Answering the Critics 
Since the publication of the Barcelona Report, two contradictory sets of criticisms have been raised in 
relation to the concept of Human Security. The first is about the concept itself, and can be found 
within the wider public and academic debate. Some critics worry that it is a new label for neo-
imperialism and a way to justify liberal interventionism and a new European militarism.  Others argue 
that far from being hawkish, the concept lacks teeth and is too ‘warm and fuzzy’ or ‘soft’.  
 
A European Way of Security must be a hard security policy, which involves the use of military force. 
What distinguishes Human Security operations from neo-imperialist interventions  is both the 
multilateral framework and the way that military force is used, which is distinct from either 
conventional war-fighting (defeating enemy combatants or insurgents) or peacekeeping (separating 
warring parties or monitoring ceasefires). Military force is used to protect individuals, to create the 
basis for a rule of law, and to arrest those who violate the law. Specifying the conditions under which 
military forces are used would help to assuage the fears of those who are concerned about EU 
ambitions to become a superpower. 
 
The second set of criticisms is about the relevance of the Human Security concept for the European 
Union. This criticism comes mainly from official elites who claim either that ‘We’re doing Human 
Security; we just don’t call it that’, or that ‘Human Security is too lofty and ambitious; it is not 
practical or realistic’.  
 
It is true that Human Security encompasses many of the concepts used by the EU in its missions; for 
example, crisis management, military-civil cooperation or conflict prevention. But it takes these 
concepts further. It draws on the debates generated by these concepts as well as other terms used 
more broadly in current global discourse such as ‘responsibility to protect’, ‘effective multilateralism’ 
and ‘human development’.  
 
Human Security is about crisis management but it is more than that because it offers a perspective on 
crises.  Stability is often considered the obverse of crisis. But from a Human Security perspective, the 
aim is not just stability; stability tends to be about the absence of overt conflict or, in economic terms, 
about halting a downward spiral of GDP. In recent years, the international community does seem to 
have learned important lessons about how to stabilise conflicts. But it has not yet learned how to 
address the security of individuals and communities – how to deal with violent organised crime, 
widespread human rights violations, or joblessness, for example.  
 
Reducing the risk of renewed crisis includes conflict prevention, which contains important aspects that 
are integral to a Human Security approach, for example, the need for a ‘bottom-up’ approach and for 
‘effective multilateralism.’ There is a tendency for the international community to be preoccupied 
with phases and to assume that different tools and instruments are appropriate in different time 
periods. Yet the ‘vulnerabilities’ described above – joblessness, weak rule of law resulting in high 
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levels of crime and human rights violations, weak institutions and capacity to provide public services 
– can be treated as structural conditions that make crises more likely. They weaken society’s capacity 
to cope with crises and they are exacerbated both by conflict and by disasters. Thus in the aftermath 
of crises, the conditions for future crises are further aggravated.  
 
Human Security capabilities also require civil-military cooperation. The Barcelona Report proposed a 
Human Security Response Force composed of both civil and military elements. Civil-military 
cooperation is more than just a matter of coordination, ‘integration’ or ‘synergies’, to borrow from 
current parlance. Human Security is about how and why civil and military capabilities are combined, 
rather than a reflex action to use them as part of a standard conflict toolkit.  
 
In classic wars, civilian humanitarian agencies always insisted on their autonomy from the military. 
Their ability to operate depended on ‘humanitarian space’ – their neutrality and impartiality was 
important to allow them to help non-combatants, prisoners of war and the wounded on all sides. 
Many humanitarian and development agencies fear that association with the military will undermine 
their ability to work and, indeed this has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan where international 
institutions are perceived to be on the side of coalition forces. In contemporary wars, where civilians 
are targets, humanitarian space is disappearing. The job of the military is to protect and preserve that 
space rather than to fight an enemy. Human Security is not just about developing a culture of 
coordination and civil-military cooperation; it is about an entirely new way of functioning in crises.   
 
In other words, a clear concept such as Human Security would allow the EU to refine and coordinate 
what it already does under multiple labels. In this sense it is not overly ambitious, it makes more sense 
of what is already being done and, as we shall argue, it would increase the coherence, effectiveness 
and visibility of European security policy. 
 
Is it utopian to suggest that Human Security might provide a discursive and operational framework 
for what the EU is trying to do? The challenge is cognitive as much as practical. Human Security does 
require a transformation in ways of thinking. Traditional concepts of security are deeply embedded in 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence and any alternative appears utopian. Yet, from the research 
we have undertaken, it seems clear that a Human Security approach is actually more realistic as a way 
of tackling current crises and would be more effective than a traditional security approach that 
emphasises the classic use of military force, or simply adds civilian capabilities to military 
peacekeeping. That is why it is so important to spell out the parameters of a European Way of 
Security. 
 
IV  From Barcelona to Madrid  
 
The Evolution of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)  
In 2003 the European Union set out a vision of a ‘secure Europe in a better world’. Since then, 
escalating conflicts in the Middle East and Afghanistan, terrorist attacks in European cities, concern 
about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of organised crime,  and the 
misery and chaos wrought by natural disasters have made Europeans feel less safe, and their 
contribution to a better world harder to identify. Yet in the past four years the EU has passed 
important milestones in its efforts to become a global security actor and shoulder its responsibilities 
towards building a peaceful world. In the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and Asia, the (ESDP) has 
provided civilian experts and military forces to help protect and rebuild societies crippled by conflict. 
Since 2003, over 11,000 personnel have been deployed on 18 missions, involving policemen, judges, 
lawyers, and administrators as well as military personnel. A 19th mission has just been added. Ten of 
those operations were active last year alone. The EU has used coercive force where necessary, it has 
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ventured far beyond its own backyard and it has provided support at crucial moments for other 
international organisations, such as the United Nations and the African Union  (See Table 1).  
 
These missions have met an important and growing demand for peacebuilders in a troubled world, 
and they have helped project the EU’s unique mix of capabilities, norms and values, and its image as a 
peaceful and prosperous zone of stability, itself forged from the ravages of war, onto a wider global 
canvas. These capabilities have provided an additional element beyond, and often alongside, the roles 
of individual member states in crisis zones. Some of these missions, as we point out in the next 
section of this Report, have incorporated novel features such as human rights advisors, an awareness 
of gender issues, and a combination of civilian and military instruments, which contribute to a 
growing accumulation of best practice. By intervening in these ways, in fragile peace processes from 
Congo to Aceh, the European Union has established an important ‘acquis’ in its external security 
policy, establishing significant precedents for how it exercises political power in the wider world. 
ESDP missions and flanking measures by the European Commission have made external relations 
the most active aspect of European integration during the past five years.  
 
The experience of ESDP missions has been an important learning process. As a result of missions 
like Aceh or Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), practitioners have begun to develop a new self-
belief and confidence about Europe’s role in the world, even though it is, as yet,  limited to policy 
makers and professionals whose job it is to implement European security policies.  
 
Despite the paralysis that resulted from the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, Member 
States have shown a willingness to act collectively in response to crisis, whether man-made through 
sectarian conflicts as was the case in Lebanon, and the DRC, or as a result of natural disasters such as 
the Asian tsunami. They have also participated in the progressive development of institutions and 
capabilities that give effect to the ambitions set out in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). 
European capabilities span the spectrum from full military forces to civilian personnel , with a 
growing hinterland of defence planning, resourcing and equipment, and training. The 13 European 
Battlegroups (BG) have been fully operational since the beginning of 2007, providing at any one time, 
two groups of up to 1500 troops available for rapid deployment within 10 days, and able to operate 
for up to four months. Each BG is associated with a Force Headquarters as well as transport and 
logistics capabilities.  
 
From 2007 the EU has its own Operations Centre in Brussels to carry out autonomous planning and 
operations activities, further reinforcing its ability to respond quickly to demands for intervention and 
crisis management, independently of Member States and NATO.  
 
Developments in civilian ESDP capabilities have also been rapid. In addition to over 700 personnel 
serving in civilian missions, the EU has developed Civilian Response Teams (CRTs), flexible in size 
and composition, which currently provide a pool of trained experts, deployable within five days, 
giving a civilian dimension to rapid response. A new chain of command for civilian operations 
includes a civilian operations commander. There is a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 
(CPCC) to support missions. Coordination between civilian and military resources has benefited from 
the setting-up of the civ-mil cell, while there have been sustained efforts to improve cooperation 
between the Council and the Commission, particularly through the efforts of recent EU presidencies, 
although the meshing of different professional cultures into a common operating framework remains 
one of the toughest challenges for Europe’s external policies. The capacity to act has also been 
strengthened by reforms to the financing of collective action under ESDP, with the aim of releasing 
funds more quickly – a lesson learned from the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia.  The Athena 
Mechanism, under which Member States fund security initiatives will continue to be reviewed with 
each new mission, although the scale and methods for funding EU operations neither match the 
ambitions of ESDP, nor  provide for a best or even use of resources between 27 member states. 
 13 
recently, attention paid to the quality of EU interventions has directed efforts to promoting areas of 
best practice such as human rights and gender mainstreaming on ESDP missions. 
 
All these developments have made a significant contribution towards fulfilling the EU’s ambition to 
be a credible force, to move from reactive to pro-active security policies, and to maximise the 
distinctive characteristics of Europe as a contributor to global security.  For over 20 years the 
European Union’s foreign policy was perceived to be ineffective, as it struggled to make decisive 
contributions to international crises, whether in the Balkans, the Middle East or central Asia. In trying 
to overcome this weakness it has placed a premium on developing a material and institutional toolkit 
that improves its capacity to act, and to meet demands for its intervention. In the process of forging 
this capacity, the principle of collective responsibility and action, in a framework which is neither 
NATO nor the nation state, has been firmly established so that a common foreign and security policy 
now exists in more than just name and the formal texts of EU treaties.  
 
However, at the heart of ESDP is an ambiguous idea of security. Although the majority of ESDP 
missions are civilian and capacity building has focussed on generating both civilian and military 
resources, it is the growing ability to use coercive force that has defined the development of ESDP 
and which has been its most radical achievement to date. The EU’s military dimension raises 
questions about why and how military force will be used in ESDP. It also has consequences for the 
relationship between the EU and other actors, from NATO to other states. A European security 
policy seen through the lens of its potential to deploy armed force looks quite different to one which 
deploys judges, police, economists and border monitors. The commitment in the draft  Reform 
Treaty to strengthen military capabilities as well as the technological and industrial base of the defence 
sector can be read in terms of traditional geo-political military aspirations. 
 
Likewise, the European Defence Agency (EDA), established in 2004, is an important aspect of the 
Union’s new military capabilities. Its goal is to develop procurement and defence industry capacity, 
including technology, intelligence and manpower, to match ESDP ambitions. The EDA’s long-term 
vision document defines its future goals as supporting the synergy of military and civil resources, 
European agility in responding to crisis, the ability to draw on a wide range of capabilities and to 
support them for long-term engagements.  Even though the long-term vision emphasises that 
European military forces will be used more to establish security and stability then ‘victory’, the 
operational parts of the vision tend to emphasise superiority over an adversary rather than the 
protection of civilians. 
  
Military ESDP changes the nature of the EU as a civilian power, a concept that has been particularly 
important in some Member States and that has been the dominant framework for European external 
policy until now. But what sort of military power? This is why it is so important to specify how 
military forces are to be used. the operational principles that guide the use of military force need to be 
specified. 
 
The civilian and military headline goals, which have framed much ESDP capacity building, are 
nearing their deadlines in 2008 and 2010, respectively. Over the next two years the European Union 
will have to address a new set of issues: in addition to its capacity to act, what should be the 
determinants of European security and the EU’s willingness to intervene beyond its borders?  What 
or whom is the Union’s security policy for, and what are the principles that guide military and civil 
implementation? The development of the last four years has brought an abundance of experience, 
and incidental successes, but not yet a refined system for European intervention. 
 
Table 1 ESDP Missions 
2003  
Concordia -military operation, using NATO assets in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(fYROM) . 
EUPOL- Proxima - Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM), 
assisting the efforts of the Government of fYROM to move closer towards EU integration. 
ARTEMIS, military mission, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1484 contributing 
to the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in 
Bunia, Democratic Republic of Congo 
EUPM (BiH) Police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina ; monitoring, mentoring and inspection. 
Refocused in 2006 to support the police reform process, develop and consolidate local capacity and 
regional cooperation in the fight against major and organised crime. 
 
2004  
Althea military mission to Bosnia Herzegovina 
EUJUST THEMIS  1st Rule of Law Mission,  to Georgia to support Georgian government with 
reform to the criminal justice system 
 
2005  
AMM  Aceh (Indonesia)monitoring mission; to monitor the implementation of various aspects of 
the peace agreement, set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the 
Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) including decommissioning of 
GAM armaments and relocation of armed forces 
Eupol Copps Palestine; to provide enhanced support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing 
sustainable and effective policing arrangements.  
EUPAT former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ;police advisory team, successor to   PROXIMA 
(qv), monitoring and mentoring local police on issues including border policing, public peace and 
order and accountability, the fight against corruption and organised crime. 
EUBam Rafah Palestine; to monitor operations of the Isaeli  border crossing point.  
EUJUST-Lex Iraq; to provide professional development opportunities to senior justice officials 
and demonstrate best practice in rule of law. 
EUPOL Kinshasa DR Congo. (now EUPOL RD Congo) To monitor, mentor and advise the 
Integrated Police Unit (IPU) and police reform 
EUSEC DR Congo advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of security  
AMISS II Darfur, Sudan ; civilian and military components to ensure effective and timely EU 
assistance to support the AMIS II enhancement.  
EU Border Assistance Mission Moldova and Ukraine; training and advice to support capacity 
building for border management and customs, to prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud . 
 
2006  
EUFOR RD Congo ; military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process  
 
2007  
Eupol Afghanistan   mentoring, advice and training for civilian police at the level of the Afghan 
Ministry of Interior, regions and provinces. 
EUPT Kosovo planning to ensure a smooth transition between tasks of the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and a possible EU crisis management operation in the 
field of rule of law and other areas 
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA military operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African 
Republic  
Source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=fr&mode=g 
Lessons from EU missions  
The Study Group undertook five case studies of EU engagement in regions where it has intervened 
to help stabilise societies that have suffered violent conflict. They were Kosovo, Aceh in Indonesia, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Palestine and the Lebanon. The case studies include both ESDP 
missions and Commission initiatives. Three of these places (Aceh, DRC, Palestine) were the subject 
of ESDP civilian or military missions. In Kosovo, the EU has been engaged through Community 
institutions (not ESDP), although the largest ever civilian ESDP mission is expected to be deployed 
to the province in 2008 and a planning team is currently on the ground there. In Lebanon, among EU 
member states, France Italy Germany and Spain participated in the UN Mission, UNIFIL (United 
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) following the war of 2006, and the European Commission is the 
leading donor, especially for reconstruction. The case studies were based on interviews in Brussels, 
national capitals and in the field, and documentary evidence; throughout, the methodology embraced 
a bottom-up approach by investigating how civil society groups and individuals experienced security 
as well as their perception of the EU role.  
 
The main findings from these studies can be summarised in relation to each of the principles. 
 
1. The Primacy of Human Rights  
Almost all the missions were sensitive to human rights, both civil and political and economic and 
social, although the extent to which they were pre-eminent or embedded  in the EU missions we 
examined was patchy.  
  
In cases such as the EUFOR military mission in DRC and Aceh there was a formal and specific 
attention to this principle, through the appointment of human rights advisers in DRC and provisions 
to support human rights initiatives such as a human rights court and a Commission for Truth and 
Reconciliation as part of the Aceh peace process. In  the DRC case this attention was reinforced with 
the novel device of a ‘Soldier’s Card’ which provided an aide memoire to troops on the ground about 
how to deal with gender issues and child soldiers from a human rights perspective. Human rights 
advisers were also incorporated into many patrols in Kinshasa to ensure that the military deployment 
paid more than lip service to human rights.  
 
However, in Aceh and the DRC, there was no explicit monitoring of human rights abuses by third 
parties. Either the mission had no provision for sanctions, as in the case of Aceh, or no jurisdiction 
over abuses by key actors. Thus in Aceh the AMM had no jurisdiction over the Indonesian security 
forces, GAM (the Free Aceh Movement), or in the case of EUFOR, it had no control over abuses by 
the Congolese police.  The AMM could also have used its role in drafting the Law on the Governance 
of Aceh (LoGA) to insist that local human rights protection was in line with international law – 
including the EU’s own legal standards. Instead, a problematic form of Sharia was implemented by 
LoGA and the AMM decided to take a 'neutral' position in order not to jeopardize the overall 
mission. 
 
In Palestine, the human rights situation is very grave. The European Union has attempted to ease the 
situation in a number of ways. The European Commission is the largest donor and it has tried to 
sustain economic assistance, despite the boycott on Hamas, through the Temporary International 
Mechanism (TIM) whereby money has been paid directly to some 4000 beneficiaries and indeed 
overall assistance increased by 27% in 2006. EU BAM is an ESDP mission that was supposed to 
facilitate freedom of movement between Gaza and Egypt but it has been paralysed by Israeli 
decisions to keep the crossing closed for most of the time (all the time since the Hamas takeover of 
Gaza). EU COPPS was another ESDP mission whose role is to help the Palestinian civil police, 
historically an effective and relatively impartial force trusted by ordinary Palestinians, in contrast to 
the other Palestinian security forces established after Oslo, which were controlled by different 
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factions and often acted in predatory ways. However, EU COPPS was badly hit by the boycott on 
Hamas because the Minister of Interior was a Hamas appointment and, meanwhile, the other 
competing security forces, under the control of Fatah or Hamas, were strengthened through finance 
and other kinds of support from the United States and Iran and Syria respectively.  
 
In Lebanon, the war with Israel in 2006 caused immense destruction and suffering. The use of cluster 
munitions by Israel caused many casualties, especially among children, and made large tracts of 
agricultural land unusable.  European Union Member States contribute to UNIFIL, the UN mission 
on the border with Israel, which has an explicit mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of 
violence. But since this is not a UN Charter Chapter VII resolution, UNIFIL can only act in self 
defence or to protect civilians at the discretion of the commander at the time. One commander has 
made it clear that UNIFIL will respond if UN forces, humanitarian NGOs or Lebanese civilians are 
directly attacked, although UNIFIL has no means to prevent air attacks at certain ranges. UNIFIL 
also carries out humanitarian tasks including the provision of emergency medical and veterinary 
services, and the destruction of munitions although it has no official certification for it.  
 
The European Commission has provided large amounts of assistance for reconstruction often at the 
local level. However, the European Union could have reacted more firmly during the war to the use 
of forbidden weapons against civilians and to war crimes that were committed. It might have 
demanded that  Israel contribute to the reconstruction of Lebanon, especially since so much 
infrastructure financed by the European Union was destroyed in the war.  The situation of Palestinian 
refugees in camps in Lebanon is extremely serious and not enough is being done to assist them.  
 
In Kosovo it is less physical violence and more the lack of economic and social rights – in terms of 
unemployment, poor electricity supply and a lack of proper roads – which lie at the heart of a 
growing security problem. Politically, the emphasis is on status settlement rather than individual 
rights. A policy of ‘keeping the peace’ often meant appeasing ethnic extremists on both sides, which 
has allowed an abnormal political economy to develop, further aggravating social and economic 
human rights.   
 
2. Legitimate Political Authority 
Most EU missions pay only indirect attention to this principle and as a result there is confusion about 
who the EU should deal with in order to deliver Human Security.  
 
In Palestine and Lebanon, EU engagement bypassed the central authorities in handing out 
reconstruction or welfare assistance, but without being able to empower an alternative level of 
authority. Indeed, in both cases it can be argued that EU assistance may actually have undermined 
central authority. In Palestine, the TIM bypassed the Palestinian Authority and allowed the 
proliferation of funding to different factions, while the failure to continue support to the police was 
associated with the fragmentation and proliferation of competing security agencies. In Lebanon, the 
European Council  and some Member States, notably France, have taken sides in the current 
confrontation between two dominant political factions and this has hampered political reconciliation. 
Direct reconstruction assistance to municipalities also meant that state authority has not been 
extended to the south of the country except through the presence of the Lebanese army.  
 
In Kosovo, although the UN administration has formal – legal – legitimacy, it has shunned joint 
decision making, which could improve local capacity. As a result the current EU presence suffers a 
deficit of local ownership, with the risk that the proposed ESDP mission to Kosovo will inherit the 
same approach as has been adopted by the United Nations administration in the province (UNMIK). 
By ignoring local forms of authority, and assuming executive functions itself in the name of 
efficiency, the EU, like UNMIK, has also squeezed the space for the return of politics and the 
normalisation of Kosovo society. 
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In DRC, the ESDP missions were established as part of a European strategy to support the first free 
elections in over 40 years. The European Union as a whole, including bilateral member state 
assistance, was the largest funder of the election. However, this raised the concern that EU 
intervention had served to strengthen a regime that is dysfunctional in terms of good governance and 
is accused of human rights infringements (which increased during the electoral process). Elections, as 
a number of scholars point out, are not necessarily the same as constructing legitimate political 
authority. 
 
3.  A Bottom-up Approach  
All the case studies found a significant difference between economic and reconstruction issues where 
a bottom-up approach was more noticeable, and political concerns where the processes were 
predominantly top-down. More could be done in terms of freeing up individuals and civil society to 
be the architects and engineers of their own recovery, and in allowing them to arbitrate the results of 
external intervention. There are few effective accountability mechanisms governing outside actors, 
and consultation and cooperation are poorly institutionalised, so that people in places such as Kosovo 
feel they are powerless in the face of decisions made in Brussels, rather than equal partners. At worst, 
as the study on Kosovo showed, minority groups such as local Serbs see themselves as bargaining 
chips in a complicated negotiation between external and local actors. The EU has also circumvented 
many civil society structures, creating new ones modelled on Western concepts of NGOs, and 
ignoring village leaders and councils of elders that are more relevant to local mores.   
 
The Aceh mission was also criticised by the local population for its top-down structure, which was 
designed to safeguard its own personnel in a hostile environment and allow for speedy evacuation. 
The structure was inefficient when it came to dealing with complex social issues such as the 
reintegration of combatants because it failed to take sufficient account of how policies were being 
received on the ground. In DRC,  mission intelligence avoided engagement with locals in order not to 
compromise their tactics and the police mission EUPOL was focused initially on helping to protect 
VIPs, although it was later broadened to include police reform. In Palestine, the decision of EU BAM 
to remain in temporary headquarters in Israel instead of the military compound in Gaza seemed to 
Palestinians  to show a lack of sensitivity to bottom-up concerns. Palestinians in Rafah whom we 
interviewed felt they could have benefited from an EU presence even if the crossing was closed; it 
would have increased their sense of security and the EU could have used the time for training 
Palestinian customs officers.  
 
Where missions paid attention to the bottom-up principle, and to using local civil society structures, 
as in the DRC, there were noticeable benefits. The military mission there was more effective because 
its soldiers spoke French and patrolled the streets on foot. An outreach plan that was designed 
initially to ensure force acceptance held public meetings, recruited local journalists for radio spots and 
produced a mass circulation newspaper, all of which raised visibility and played a critical role in 
changing the perceptions of EUFOR as a ‘foreign army’ to a neutral but benign force.   
 
In Palestine, there have been efforts by the Commission to consult and engage civil society, especially 
in reconciliation, and the police mission took a typically bottom-up approach. In Lebanon, EU 
support for the top-down imposition of economic reforms, though  ‘technically perfect’, was not 
discussed through a broad political process, and this has contributed to the perception that the EU is 
trying to pursue its own ‘neo-liberal’ agenda. One constructive independent bottom-up initiative is 
the development of Lebanese-European municipality networks. Much more could be done to 
encourage transversal civil society initiatives that cross the deep political divide in Lebanon. 
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4. Effective Multilateralism 
From the evidence of these missions, the EU is a reliable partner on the ground in conflict zones. It 
works with both other international and regional organisations and is successful in using and 
leveraging individual nation/Member State involvement. The case of the AMM in Aceh underlined 
the importance of effective multilateralism. The cooperation between the EU, Norway, Switzerland 
and five of the ASEAN countries gave the EU monitoring forces credibility on the ground and was 
thus critical to the success of the mission. In DRC  the professionalism of EUFOR made it a valuable 
asset to MONUC, the UN peacekeeping force, supplying not only effective assistance but in being 
seen as a neutral force.  
 
If anything there are grounds to suggest that the EU could be more bold in asserting its presence in 
multilateral engagements. In the Middle East the effectiveness of multilateralism was limited by a 
dominant US agenda of the global ‘War on Terror’, in which the interests of states take precedence 
over the every day experience of individuals. In Kosovo and DRC effectiveness was hampered by the 
lack of institutionalised coordination between different agencies, both EU and other actors.  
 
5.  Regional Focus  
Only the Aceh mission took an explicit regional focus towards addressing its goals, and this was 
crucial to its success. Other missions tended to concentrate on the symptoms of insecurity present in 
the specific country where the mission occurred. Poor coordination with other EU agencies, and 
poor use of the regional fora available undermined the chances of a broader geographic perspective 
on the causes and possible solutions of conflicts. While some missions had technically a wider 
context (for example, the decision to send troops to DRC or to assist with security sector reform 
were part of the EU’s Strategy for Africa), in practice this context got lost on the ground.  
 
In the Middle East, a regional focus is urgently needed. Peace and reconciliation in Lebanon 
necessarily involves Lebanon’s neighbours. There has to be both dialogue and pressure on Israel, 
Syria and Iran if any lasting peace is to be established. The same is true in Palestine where much more 
could be done to involve Israel’s neighbours. Saudi Arabia played a critical role in the Mecca 
Agreement, which led to the unity government, which might have succeeded had it received more 
outside support. Likewise, the Arab League Peace Initiative could be a fruitful starting point for the 
current talks. 
 
6.  Clear and Transparent Strategic Direction  
In all the missions except Aceh there was a problem of competing competences, with different 
approaches being pursued by the Council, the Commission, the various EU agencies and member 
states. In Palestine and Lebanon there is a serious gap between the political level (mainly the Council 
and member states) and what was happening on the ground (both Commission and ESDP missions 
and, in the case of Lebanon, UNIFIL). In Palestine, in particular, there have been real efforts to meet 
economic and social needs, and to support the police and freedom of movement, but these efforts are 
constrained by the policies pursued at a political level by the quartet framed by the War on Terror, 
which means that Israel’s state security priorities come before the human security of Palestinians.  
 
The same finding applies to the EUFOR mission in DRC. The EU engagement in DRC was 
compromised by a gap between the political/strategic direction of the mission and what was required 
practically on the ground. Efforts to engage with local opinion proved to be of critical importance for 
the success of the EU mission, but were thrown into jeopardy by the political decision to redeploy 
the force, and the appearance of ‘cutting and running’ when the electoral process was barely 
complete. EUFOR distributed 2007 calendars to local people as a way of maintaining EU ‘presence’ 
and visibility beyond the limited mandate after a hurried and unsatisfactory end to the mission, which 
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had more to do with German public opinion and wanting soldiers home by Christmas 2006 than the 
needs of the Congolese. 
 
In most missions mandates were problematic, sometimes because they were overly restrictive. In 
DRC the mandate stipulated that the mission would have two headquarters, that at least half the 
troops should be based outside the country, their remit was to operate only in the area of Kinshasa, 
and that the duration of the mission should be restricted to four to five months. These restrictions 
compromised the effectiveness of the mission and its human security impact.  
 
In Aceh,  the mandate limited the competence of the AMM with regard to  human rights. In other 
cases, mandates were – perhaps deliberately – opaque, so they gave no clear sense of purpose or goals 
to operations on the ground. In Kosovo and Palestine mandates were unclear partly because the EU 
operated through a number of different agencies, with no overall plan for their coordination 
 
The decision to deploy a mission and the need to back this with a legal document to which all 
Member States agree,  leads to a lack of specifics and/or a decision to compromise on the duration 
and nature of the mission in order to secure political backing. This might be difficult to avoid, but 
better provision for post-mission follow-through or smooth handovers, either to local parties or 
other EU agencies, could alleviate some of these problems.  
 
What conclusions can we draw from this review of recent EU international 
operations?   
 
All the cases of EU engagement we examined contained at least some elements of Human Security, 
reinforcing the view that, far from being a radical leap in the dark, a Human Security approach could 
build on what is already being done in ESDP and increase its coherence and effectiveness. Indeed, 
the DRC and Aceh missions showed that a learning process is already underway, particularly in terms 
of the design of the mission, and especially in relation to human rights and the bottom-up principle. 
Yet, where elements of a Human Security approach exist, they are often haphazard, even accidental, 
and specific to one mission, or to the vision of one mission commander. If the standards and 
achievements of all EU missions are to improve, there should be a more systematic and integrated 
application of core principles and methods. 
 
The principles are useful in providing a way to assess EU missions and their effect on the ground.  
They offer a set of criteria and tests about how these missions performed, and the effectiveness of 
their means as well as their objectives. This is helpful in not only defining what a Human Security 
approach should be on the ground, but in providing guidelines for how to implement it. The case 
studies also show how the Human Security principles are interlinked and why it is necessary to 
develop a comprehensive framework for Human Security. Each principle needs to be embedded 
within an overall approach because shortcomings in applying one principle have consequences for 
another, and so limit the overall success of missions. This failure to give primacy to human rights or 
to take a bottom-up approach can easily undermine the legitimacy of political authority and vice 
versa. In DRC during the critical attacks on the opposition candidate of August 2006, EUFOR was 
brought in to assist MONUC and this greatly increased the legitimacy and effectiveness of EUFOR 
as it was seen as both neutral and forceful. 
 
At the same  time, the studies showed that the principles may also raise certain dilemmas, in that they 
sometimes conflict. In DRC and Aceh, EU intervention aimed to provide support for an electoral 
process, which was seen as a route to the normalisation of societies emerging from violence.  In DRC 
this strategy was criticised by local groups for encouraging human rights abuses as parties suppressed 
their opponents in order to win. Furthermore, the election outcome served to strengthen a 
government that is seen as a significant source of human rights violations, and therefore lacking in 
legitimacy.   
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Thirdly, all the case studies showed a lack of clear political direction. This was partly due to 
institutional incoherence between EU agencies, and different goals on the part of the Council, the 
Commission and the member states. In many cases, it also reflects a gap between what many 
courageous and committed members of European missions were trying to achieve on the ground, 
and what was happening at the level of high politics where considerations like the War on Terror, or 
the need for a rapid exit strategy to satisfy domestic constituencies, took precedence over human 
needs as identified through bottom-up consultations. There is also a problem translating high-level 
declarations, for example on the inclusion of women in peacebuilding operations, or the protection of 
the rights of young people, into action. This is why a Human Security approach, which would provide 
conceptual coherence, is so vital to the implementation of policy.    
 
 
Table 2: Summary of Findings from Case Studies 
   
Human 
Security 
Principles 
 
Regions 
 
 
Primacy of 
human rights 
(HR) 
 
 
Legitimate 
political 
authority 
 
Clear and 
transparent 
mandate 
 
Bottom-up 
approach 
 
Effective 
multilateralism 
 
 
Integrated 
regional 
approach 
DRC  
(EUFOR; 
EUPOL-
Kinshasa; 
EUSEC) 
overall sensitive 
to HR; ‘Soldier’s 
Card’ with 
instructions on 
use of force, 
gender issues 
and dealing with 
child soldiers; 
limited length 
and scope of 
mission; lack of 
clear legal 
mandate 
particularly 
regarding HR 
abuses by other 
actors. 
 
mission helped 
to achieve fair 
elections; 
question of 
ability of 
elections to 
produce 
legitimate 
political 
authority; 
concerns that 
EU helped 
legitimise 
dysfunctional 
regime. 
 
formal 
mandate less 
clear on the 
ground; lack of 
clarity in regard 
to HR; 
challenge to 
overcome 
suspicion by 
locals; 
problems 
caused by 
redeployment.  
Partial bottom-
up approach; 
dedicated 
outreach units 
within EUFOR; 
systematic and 
successful 
engagement  
with locals took 
into account 
local public 
opinion and 
grassroots views; 
soldiers spoke 
French; EUPOL 
focus on VIPs. 
 
clearly 
multilateral but  
problems re 
effectiveness of 
multilateralism; 
no unity of 
command 
between EU and 
MONUC; lack 
of co-ordination 
between 
EUFOR and 
other EU 
initiatives.   
 
 
mission 
situated within 
context of 
Strategy for 
Africa; lack of 
integrated 
regional 
approach due 
to limited 
geographical 
scope of 
mandate 
(restricted to 
Kinshasa); 
importance of 
South Africa 
and Angola 
for transition 
process not 
sufficiently 
taken into 
account at 
outset of 
EUPOL. 
 
Palestine  
(EU BAM; 
EUCOPS) 
generally 
sensitive to HR 
but constrained 
by boycott; 
ineffective role 
in Rafah 
regarding 
freedom of 
movement; 
concern for 
social and 
economic rights; 
emphasis on 
police. 
lack of funds 
for police and 
direct payments 
to beneficiaries 
undermined the 
Palestinian 
Authority, with 
serious 
consequences. 
impossibility of 
a clear mandate 
given the 
differing roles 
of different EU 
actors and the 
gap between 
EU 
involvement in 
the Quartet 
and EU 
activities on 
the ground. 
partial bottom-up 
approach; 
EUCOPS 
mission 
constrained by 
boycott.; 
shortcomings in 
EU BAM 
mission because 
not based in 
Gaza and 
because of Israeli 
pressure.  
 
overall 
engagement 
shaped by US 
agenda and 
‘GWOT’ 
paradigm. 
shortcomings 
in regional 
integration 
(lack of 
attention to 
the Arab 
League Peace 
Plan).  
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Lebanon sensitive to HR; 
significant 
concerns for 
social and 
economic rights 
by UN Mission, 
(with  Italian and 
French 
involvement) 
and through 
local support for 
reconstruction. 
support for 
government 
impeded  
compromise 
between two 
dominant 
factions; 
reconstruction, 
assistance direct 
to local 
authorities 
aggravated 
weakness and 
invisibility (in 
the south) of  
Lebanese state. 
confusion 
about different 
roles of EU; 
Commission 
support for 
HR; Council 
role to support 
the 
government. 
economic 
assistance and 
UN Mission both 
bottom-up; 
participation by 
local 
communities in 
reconstruction;  
UN Mission 
engaged in 
various 
humanitarian 
activities and in 
regular 
consultations. 
EU and UN 
cooperation; 
political 
engagement 
shaped by US 
agenda and the 
Global War on 
Terror.  
lack of 
regional 
approach. 
Need for 
dialogue with 
Iran, Syria and 
Israel. 
Kosovo EU engagement 
officially 
embedded 
within HR 
rhetoric; on the 
ground: 
HR not prime 
concern of EU 
engagement; 
significant 
concerns for 
social and 
economic rights; 
key failure was 
jobs. 
lack of local 
ownership and 
joint decision 
making in 
creating 
legislation; 
problem of 
accountability; 
lack of exit and 
handover 
strategy; 
distinction 
between 
development 
and political 
aims in 
mandates 
problematic. 
lack of clear 
and 
transparent 
EU mandate, 
multiple EU 
agencies,  
no overarching 
portfolio and 
agenda; 
distinction 
between 
political and 
development 
goals.  
 
lack of coherent 
bottom-up 
approach; no 
consultations 
with civil society 
in legislation and 
policy making; 
insufficient 
attempts at 
institutionalising 
consultation 
mechanisms to 
redirect 
ownership to 
Kosvars; 
minorities (e.g. 
Kosovo Serbs) 
not directly 
engaged; 
constrained by 
lack of civil 
society groups on 
the ground; poor 
standards of 
capacity, 
accountability, 
corruption 
mistrusted by 
other locals. 
lack of 
coordination 
between six EU 
agencies; 
multilayered EU 
presence without 
central Kosovo-
based 
coordinating 
body to 
streamline EU 
efforts, ensure 
coherency,  
significant lack 
of coordination 
between 
development and 
political efforts; 
bilateral 
engagement of 
MS without 
consultation and 
coherence 
regarding EU 
policy 
framework. 
regional 
approach 
visible but lack 
of effective 
coordination  
systematic 
involvement 
of all minority 
groups 
essential but 
missing. 
 
Aceh 
(AMM) 
monitoring of 
HR abuses fell 
short; mission 
success put 
before more 
pro-active stand 
on HR; limited 
extent of HR 
mandate (e.g. no 
sanctioning 
power); poor 
coordination on 
HR; specific 
problem of 
Sharia.  
 
free and fair 
elections 
possible in 
December 2006; 
questions of 
legitimate 
political 
authority 
overshadowed 
by HR 
problems. 
 
debates 
between  
Commission 
and Council 
about 
deployment  
poor funding 
mechanisms 
and slow 
release of 
funds; 
legitimacy of 
EU forces 
improved 
through  
cooperation 
with ASEAN; 
clearer HR 
mandate 
would have 
been helpful. 
focus on mission 
protection led to 
top-down 
structure; lack of 
language skills; 
lack of culturally-
sensitive training; 
way Sharia was 
implemented in 
the Law on 
Governance 
(LoGA) 
constrained 
bottom-up 
efforts;  
concerns of local 
HR groups not 
implemented; 
civil society 
groups not 
included in peace 
negotiations.   
 
EU worked with 
Finland, Sweden 
and UK to 
establish mission; 
with 5 ASEAN 
countries in 
implementation; 
cooperation with 
ASEAN provides  
model for future 
regional co-
operation. 
cooperation 
between EU 
and ASEAN 
forces was a 
crucial factor 
in the success 
of the peace 
monitoring 
mission. 
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V Challenges for CFSP/ESDP 
 
How should CFSP/ESDP develop in the next four years, in a changing international context which is 
likely to increase further ‘the demand for Europe’? The EU’s new capabilities face three interlinked 
challenges:  
 
1. Coherence: although terms like coordination, synergy and integration have become the buzzwords 
of European security, they remain difficult – and frequently controversial - to achieve in practice. 
Incoherence is both institutional and functional. It spreads horizontally, between the different 
professional and institutional forms of EU security – between civilian and military resources, between 
the Commission and the Council, or between the EU and the member states. In large organisations, 
institutional coherence is almost impossible to achieve. As has been noted in Brussels, ‘everyone talks 
about coordination, but nobody wants to be coordinated.’ Coordination mechanisms can easily end 
up adding unnecessary layers of bureaucracy and introducing yet more ’stove-piping’. What is needed 
is conceptual rather than institutional coherence, to be clear about shared goals and principles and to 
encourage notions of public service and commitment. Increasing attention is being paid to developing 
a European security culture. Equally, considerable efforts have gone into removing the institutional 
barriers between different parts of the EU’s security policy making. But without a clear and common 
understanding of the aims and the means of security policy, security initiatives will remain confused 
and unfocused. 
 
2. Effectiveness: there has been considerable emphasis in recent years on the ‘activeness’ of the EU 
in global security. This has been seen in terms of the EU’s ability to respond quickly to crises, to pre-
empt violent conflict and to make its presence count beyond economic and trading power. 
Effectiveness is more than just the capacity to act however. It requires a sense of what the EU is 
trying to achieve with its security policies, as well as the ability to measure their impact. For example, 
the expansion of the EU’s military dimension is one  controversial aspect of its ability to be active. 
The option to use coercive force is a significant departure from the EU’s civilian or soft power 
profile, but there is little discussion about how and when it is to be used other than as a rapid reaction 
mechanism.  Similarly the development of civilian and military instruments adds significantly to 
Europe’s value as an international security actor, capable of dealing with complex crises that  require a 
full spectrum of types of assistance. But to be effective, the EU has to know how to combine these 
capabilities. Coherence is also part of effectiveness.  
 
3. Visibility: despite the growth in capabilities and an increased presence in some of the most 
publicised conflicts around the globe, European missions go unnoticed by the majority of its citizens, 
while those on the receiving end of EU intervention are either unaware or dismissive of EU efforts. 
Visibility is also related to effectiveness. In DRC, the millions of Euros contributed by the European 
Commission, Member States and the EUFOR ESDP mission to make free elections possible were 
dwarfed by local perceptions that focused mainly on the UN presence in the country and saw a 
European contribution as less significant. In Kosovo the military presence of NATO – and in 
particular the Americans – counts for more among the population than the highly fragmented 
European presence. This lack of EU visibility is linked to the absence of a clear policy concept that 
would help to increase the public impact of EU missions, and address doubts about the reasons for 
such intervention. Better visibility would help both internal and external legitimacy. As shown by the 
fierce debates in the German parliament and media over the deployment of German troops as part of 
the EUFOR DRC mission in 2006, the EU needs to find ways to explain and justify external 
operations, not only in financial terms, but in terms of the human cost to EU personnel who may be 
placed in harm’s way.   
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In summary, the EU has developed a wide range of both civilian and military security capabilities 
since 2003, yet their integration within a framework that expresses a clear sense of purpose and 
security identity remains a work in progress. The European Security Strategy offers an outline 
framework for a European security ‘identity’ but it does not yet amount to an operating manual or 
even a set of design instructions. Such a framework will greatly contribute to the coherence, 
effectiveness and visibility of EU security policy.  
 
VI A European Way of Security  
 
Security is bound up with political legitimacy. We feel safe if we trust our political institutions and we 
trust our political institutions if we see that they are acting effectively in crises. However, the debate 
about the ways in which we act in crises and particularly about the legitimacy of external intervention 
has been reshaped fundamentally by the events of 9/11 and the consequences of the ‘global war on 
terror’, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. While these events have focused public attention on the 
global nature of security, and the fact that instability in distant places can have a devastating effect on 
the streets of European capitals, there is also a growing realisation that waging ‘war’ to resolve these 
problems is not working.  
 
In large parts of the world people fear being killed, robbed, raped, tortured, detained, or expelled 
from their homes and livelihoods. Wars, natural disasters, famines, new and old diseases, or financial 
crises are among the risks that contribute to a pervasive sense of insecurity. Yet current security 
arrangements, which largely consist of conventional military forces trained and equipped to defend 
borders and fight wars do not address these sources of insecurity. On the contrary, in places like the 
Middle East or Central Asia, interventions based on them have made things worse.  Even with formal 
and legally sanctioned mandates, it has become harder to justify external intervention because from 
the Balkans to the Middle East and Asia, intervention has become tainted by the suffering of civilian 
populations on the ground. Far from helping to alleviate crisis and insecurity, the international 
community – and the ‘West’ in particular - is perceived as part of the problem.  This security gap is 
also a legitimacy gap. 
 
The drive to provide the Union with a more functional framework has already led to the 
Constitutional Treaty and now the proposed Reform Treaty. But the defeat of the Constitution has 
meant a defensive approach towards the Reform Treaty. If the European Union could adopt effective 
policies to increase our sense of security, this could mobilise public support and, in so doing, 
reinvigorate the process of European integration and support for the European project.  
 
What we have sought to do in this Report is to define a European Way of Security in terms of the 
concept of Human Security. We have attempted to show how this concept is relevant to 
CFSP/ESDP and spell out how it can bring extra value to the European Union’s security policies. 
The European Union needs such a concept in order to formulate and implement the strategic and 
operational aspects of EU security policies and to be  bold in promoting its distinctive vision. 
 
Key Proposals  
In order to advance the Human Security agenda within the European Union, we propose: 
 
 A Public Declaration of Human Security Principles 
This could take the form of a protocol or charter, agreed by the 27 EU members.  It would affirm 
member states’ core beliefs and values in relation to international operations, and would provide clear 
guidance to EU institutions as to how to act collectively on behalf of member states. Alongside, or as 
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part of the European Security Strategy it would be a  basis for determining when and where  the EU 
intervenes in crises. The declaration would also be a starting point in helping to formulate rules of 
engagement and operating procedures, and as such would provide an important link between the 
political will of Member States and actions on the ground.  
 
By setting out clear principles that are about both the goals and methods of EU security operations, a 
declaration would improve the transparency and therefore the domestic accountability of European 
foreign policy. It would help to address the democratic deficit within the European Union by creating 
a visible ‘code’ for security policies which defines – more explicitly than the ESS – the nature of EU 
foreign policy for the European Union’s citizens.   
 
European security policy also needs to be clear to those outside the Union, on the receiving end of 
security missions and of Commission initiatives. The current language of security reflects the 
cumbersome and complicated jargon of Brussels institutions, rather than helping to promote good 
communications and cooperative partnerships between the EU and local populations. A declaration 
of principles would help to simplify and clarify to the EU’s partners the defining characteristics of its 
foreign policy. And it would provide a standard, which could be used by local populations to increase 
the accountability of intervening forces. 
 
 A New Strategic Framework for ESDP Missions 
By this we mean a comprehensive way of organising EU international operations which recognises 
that the ultimate goal of intervening in crises is to restore politics as normal, and not to create long 
term armies of occupation or international administrations. Every ESDP mission, including military 
missions, should be placed within a planning and operational framework headed by a civilian 
commander, who has the political skills to understand both local and international political 
complexities and who can provide the link between ordinary people on the ground and political 
leaders in Brussels, as well as sending countries. The commander would spearhead an intervention 
plan that would aim to assist the civilian population to establish a legitimate political authority and 
thereby provide an exit strategy. 
 
This would go beyond current efforts to coordinate ESDP initiatives with Commission 
responsibilities towards conflict management.  It would be a more effective way of ensuring that all 
the Union’s crisis instruments are brought together at the earliest stage, of embedding the principles 
of respect for human rights and legitimate political authority, and ensuring that operations pay 
attention to the multilateral, regional and bottom-up aspects of intervention. The aim of such a 
framework would be to place even short term, rapid responses within a long- term time frame, and 
emphasise the importance of allowing communities time and space to build the conditions for peace 
themselves.  
 
 Concrete Steps to implement a Human Security Approach  
In addition to giving political backing at the level of Member States to the principles of Human 
Security, we propose that the EU adopts a number of practical measures to translate this commitment 
into ESDP operations.  
 
These would include:  
 
 The adoption of Human Security ESDP mandates that would give legal expression to the 
goals of Human Security, and would provide for and insist on follow-up and coordination 
procedures between ESDP missions and the work of other EU institutions such as the 
Commission.  
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 All mission personnel to be issued with ‘Human Security’ cards, a pocket-sized brochure 
setting out the six principles in order to make clear both the methods and the goals of 
external operations. 
 
 The systematic use of assistance on the ground to troops and civilian experts in promoting 
human rights and ensuring the participation of women and young people in measures to 
promote stability and reconstruction. 
 
  EU institutions including the Commission and the European Parliament should use Human 
Security principles as benchmarks for evaluating ESDP missions and Commission 
programmes, and as means to improve the accountability of EU forces, whether military or 
civilian for their actions during operations.  
 
 The principles should also be incorporated into training programmes and military and civilian 
exercises as a way of developing a common operating culture, and to help develop quality 
standards among EU professionals. Currently, training for EU missions  reflects some of the 
harsher truths about the EU as a security actor: it is a mosaic of different national and 
professional cultures and capabilities. Human Security training would promote better 
horizontal coordination of military and civilian functions, and an understanding of their 
respective roles, and it could become the basis for a quality ‘kitemark’ in mission training to 
which all Member States should be required to subscribe. Preparation for missions needs to 
reflect the distinctive goals and methodology of EU security policy and Human Security 
training would equip EU forces to put its principles at the heart of mission planning and 
execution.     
 
This is the moment for Europeans to be clearer about how they will act collectively in foreign policy. 
As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to be escalating and spreading, and as new anxieties about 
security undermine people’s trust in our institutions, there is an urgent need for the European Union 
to take a lead in adopting an approach that could do more to make not only Europeans but also the 
rest of the world feel safer.  
 
The EU is poised to become a significant global actor. In the next five years it must not only respond 
to a growing demand for crisis management, but also define and implement a foreign policy culture 
and approach that provide a role model for global security. Much has been done since 2003 to 
prepare for this role. As Javier Solana points out, there is a ‘European model’ of multilateralism, 
coherence and partnership emerging in foreign policy. However, this model is not fully codified at 
present and the EU has developed a limited common language to express what this model is and how 
it works.  
 
The emerging European model is perhaps the only way that the global security needs of the twenty-
first century can be fulfilled. A new phase of the European Security and Defence Policy is needed to 
spell out the philosophy and the operating methods that define a European Way of Security. For 50 
years the European Union has applied its inventiveness to creating a peaceful community among its 
member states. Now it needs to show that it can be equally innovative and committed in addressing 
crises in the wider world.  
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